The Specialized Criminal Court under the control of the Houthi group in Sana’a has issued a ruling sentencing seventeen detainees to death by firing squad in a public square, following an expedited trial that lasted only two weeks and included ten consecutive sessions characterized by haste and a lack of minimum guarantees of justice.
The group accuses these detainees of spying for the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Israel as part of what it calls the “Joint Operations Room Cells.”
Observers and human rights activists view this case as an indication of the judiciary being employed as a tool for political intimidation, and as a precursor to a mass execution reminiscent of similar operations carried out in previous years outside proper judicial standards.
According to local media reports and human rights testimonies, the sessions held between November 9 and 22, 2025—two sessions per day—were conducted mostly without the presence of defense lawyers. The detainees were also prevented from communicating with their families or appointing independent legal counsel.
The same sources indicate that the confessions on which the court relied were likely extracted under coercion. The group’s media broadcast parts of these confessions before the verdict was issued—an action considered a clear violation of investigative procedures and fair-trial guarantees.
A review of the names of those sentenced, based on lists circulated by local media, shows that the Houthi group concealed the surnames of several defendants—interpreted as an attempt to avoid possible social backlash—particularly after the name of Major General Ali Ahmed Al-Sayyani, former director of the Military Intelligence Directorate and one of the most prominent officers from the Sanhan tribe in Sana’a Governorate, appeared among those sentenced.
Local reports suggest that the list included sons of tribal sheikhs and well-known figures, and that some names were altered or partially concealed. It also included defendants who remain under house arrest rather than actual detention, including Major General Ali Ahmed Al-Sayyani, who served as the director of the Military Intelligence Directorate at the Ministry of Defense under former president Ali Abdullah Saleh—highlighting inconsistencies in the Houthi narrative surrounding the case.
Despite the group’s efforts to portray the defendants as part of an “international espionage network,” human rights testimonies and informed sources, as well as a review of the names, indicate that several of those sentenced to death are ordinary citizens with no qualifications or capabilities that match the severity of the accusations leveled against them. Among them are a fish vendor who owns only an old phone, a day-labor farmer, a taxi driver, and government employees who were among those demanding the payment of their salaries, in addition to a person reportedly suffering from a psychological disorder.
These details collectively point to the fragility of the case’s foundations and suggest that its purpose may be tied to reinforcing security control and intimidating the local community, especially amid heightened public tension.
Prior to the trial sessions, the group’s media launched a wide-scale propaganda campaign that included broadcasting recorded confessions and media reports presented by senior figures, including Ali Hussein Al-Houthi, son of the group’s founder and head of a newly established intelligence body called the “Police Intelligence Agency,” in addition to filming the detainees in degrading ways, according to local media outlets and human rights groups.
These actions are believed to fall within a broader media and political strategy aimed at reinforcing the group’s narrative and promoting an image portraying the defendants as part of an external conspiracy—against a backdrop of a severe economic and living crisis and growing popular anger over unpaid salaries and deteriorating public conditions.
From a legal standpoint, Yemeni human rights experts argue that these verdicts lack constitutional basis, as they were issued by a court established by an authority whose legitimacy is unrecognized. They also point to the absence of fair-trial guarantees, including the ability of defendants to present a proper defense and the lack of judicial independence as stipulated in the Yemeni constitution and international conventions. Moreover, carrying out public executions under exceptional procedures constitutes, under international law, a violation of the right to life—particularly when the trial fails to meet minimum standards of justice.
This case cannot be separated from similar precedents in areas under the group’s control, including the execution of nine civilians—one of them a minor—in Al-Tahrir Square in 2021, on charges of providing coordinates that led to the death of the group’s leader Saleh Al-Samad, who was killed in a coalition airstrike. The incident at the time sparked wide local and international condemnation.
A recurring pattern is evident in the nature of the accusations, the doubtful confessions, and the intensive propaganda campaigns—demonstrating the group’s persistence in exploiting the judicial apparatus as a means to consolidate power through punitive measures that instill fear and enforce subjugation.
These developments suggest that the Houthi group is moving toward a more hardline phase in governing the areas under its control, by reinforcing a parallel judicial system that lacks real accountability and is used to provide a façade of legitimacy for widespread violations. In the absence of meaningful international pressure, such policies are likely to continue—with increased risks of further mass executions and a widening scope of abuses in the period ahead.
