Since September 3, 2026, the war in Yemen has entered its most extensive and bloodiest phase on the ground since the UN-brokered truce of April 2022. Fighting has spread from western Taiz and southern Hodeidah to fronts in Hayfan, Al-Bayda, and Al-Jawf, accompanied by intensive use of ballistic missiles, drones, and artillery, before its regional repercussions extended to a large-scale Houthi attack on four cities in southern Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, neither side had achieved a decisive strategic shift by the end of September 8. The overall front lines remained largely unchanged, while control shifted over a limited number of hills and positions. As the Houthis committed their full weight to attacks on the western coast fronts in an attempt to reach the shores of Bab al-Mandab, forces of the legitimate government chose to attack in Al-Bayda governorate in central Yemen and Al-Jawf in the northeast, without making tangible progress.
Western Taiz and Yemen’s western coast remained the center of the fighting, with Houthi attacks concentrated on the mountainous highlands west of Taiz in Maqbanah, Al-Kadhah, Al-Wazi’iyah, and Mawza, as well as Al-Barh and Hays in Hodeidah, alongside bombardment of Mokha and Al-Khawkhah.
This pattern points to an attempt to put pressure on the road linking Taiz city to the coast and to establish control on the ground over the port of Mokha and Bab al-Mandab.
Although the Houthis have not explicitly declared control of the strait a direct objective of their operations, the direction of their attacks and the nature of the targeted positions, together with statements by the presidency, the government, and government military commanders, suggest that the group is seeking to expand its influence toward the coast and the strait. This is particularly significant given the pressure Tehran faces in its confrontation with the United States. Any advance in this direction would strengthen the ability of the Houthis and their ally Iran to exert pressure on shipping and energy supplies off Yemen, alongside tensions in the Strait of Hormuz.
From an Incomplete Truce to a Widespread Outbreak of Fighting
The UN-brokered truce began on April 2, 2022, and lasted six months. The United Nations described it as the longest period of relative calm since the war began, before it expired on October 2 of the same year without an agreement to extend it.
Despite the truce’s formal expiration, the following years did not see a full return to large-scale battles along the front lines, with intermittent exchanges of fire and limited attacks. The September 2026 wave therefore represents a qualitative shift: larger troop concentrations, repeated assault waves, multiple geographic theaters, and unusually intensive missile and drone attacks.
This wave did not emerge in a vacuum. Throughout July and August, Houthi attacks escalated against Mokha, Marib, Hadramout, and the western coast, while the Houthis announced what they called a “naval blockade” on Saudi vessels.
At the beginning of September, the pressure shifted from repeated threats and long-range strikes to an attempt to change the front lines through ground operations in western Taiz and southern Hodeidah. Government forces then responded with counterattacks and expanded their operations into Al-Jawf and Al-Bayda.
The Main Front: Western Taiz and the Western Coast
Maqbanah, Al-Kadhah, and Jabal Habashi
Since dawn on September 3, the Houthi offensive has focused on the Maqbanah, Al-Tuwair, Al-Kadhah, and Jabal Ghubari sectors, a mountainous area linking the western part of Taiz city to Mokha and the coast within the same governorate.
The group relied on heavy preparatory bombardment and successive waves of fighters. According to corroborating field accounts, it temporarily captured a limited number of hills before government forces retook some of them. On September 4, government forces announced the recapture of Al-Khazzan and Al-Makahinah hills, while clashes continued around other positions without a major change to the overall map of control compared with the beginning of the month.
Al-Kadhah’s importance extends beyond its size. It is a junction on routes linking Taiz city and its rural areas to the coastal city of Mokha. Any sustained Houthi advance there could put pressure on supply lines and partially separate the inland fronts from military formations on the coast. However, the mountainous terrain, the concentration of defensive positions, and the presence of multiple government military formations have made the offensive costly and slow.
Al-Barh, Mawza, and Hays
Alongside the fighting in western Taiz, neighboring fronts flared up as the offensive expanded toward Hays and Al-Barh in southern Hodeidah, as well as Mawza in western Taiz. Government forces and the Joint Forces announced that they had repelled attacks and recaptured positions. On September 5, they announced that they had completed their takeover of Hays, secured rural areas, and advanced toward Al-Jarrahi. Operations also extended to the Hayfan front in southern Taiz, where government forces announced the capture of the hills of Saeed Taha, Dhiban, Al-Khudayrah, and Al-Najdayn.
These announcements remain claims by a party to the fighting, and no independent mechanism was available to map territorial control in real time. Nevertheless, the continuing attacks and counterattacks indicate that the area remained a theater of back-and-forth fighting, rather than a front where one side was collapsing.
Houthi pressure on the western Taiz fronts continued through September 8, with artillery and missile bombardment and successive deployments of reinforcements. Fighting in these sectors continued to involve exchanges of attacks and attempts to consolidate positions, without a broad and lasting shift in the lines of control.
Bab al-Mandab at the Heart of the Calculations
The Bab al-Mandab Strait occupies a central place in the calculations behind the Houthi escalation in western Taiz and along the western coast. Advancing toward positions close to it, or keeping Mokha and its supply routes under threat, gives the group greater capacity to threaten navigation in the Red Sea and strengthens Iran’s leverage amid tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and growing concerns over energy supplies.
In a statement on September 6, National Resistance Forces spokesperson Sadiq Dweid described the clashes as “bone-breaking battles,” saying that the Houthis were seeking to reach and seize control of Bab al-Mandab.
However, this objective, as described by government forces, remains far removed from the results on the ground. Houthi attacks have not achieved a breakthrough that would allow them to breach the defensive lines extending from western Taiz to Mokha and Dhubab and reach the strait.
With their advance faltering, the group may count on maintaining pressure on coastal roads and positions and wearing down government forces to improve its military and negotiating position, even without gaining direct control of Bab al-Mandab.
Limited Government Advances in Al-Jawf and Al-Bayda
In Al-Jawf, government forces announced on September 7 that they had captured large parts of Al-Labanat camp east of Al-Hazm city and were continuing to clear Houthi pockets around it. Reports later emerged of advances toward Al-Yatmah in Khabb wa Al-Sha’af district. This represents an important localized shift because it forces the Houthis to divide their forces between the coast and the northeastern front. However, based on the information available by the end of September 8, it does not amount to the recapture of Al-Hazm city or a comprehensive change in the governorate’s map of control.
In Al-Bayda, government forces and allied formations carried out operations in areas bordering Lahj governorate, including areas and villages in Al-Zahir district. These followed strikes on Houthi positions in Al-Sharyah, Dhi Na’im, and Al-Sawadiyah.
As in Al-Jawf, the advances remained limited and uneven. With consolidation proving difficult, the principal value of these movements lies in broadening pressure on the Houthis and preventing them from concentrating all their forces on Taiz and Hodeidah, rather than in extensive territorial gains.
The Attack on Saudi Arabia and the Message of Regional Pressure
On September 8, the Houthis announced a large-scale operation involving dozens of ballistic missiles and drones against targets in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan, and Najran.
Saudi authorities said the attacks injured 73 civilians, including women and children, and damaged energy installations and economic and public service facilities.
Politically, the wave appears to be an attempt to raise the cost of Riyadh’s support for the Yemeni government and forces and to pressure it into curbing the government counteroffensive. In response, Saudi Arabia affirmed its right to defend its sovereignty and citizens and rejected the Houthis’ hostile approach and threats to navigation. As attacks shifted from inside Yemen to vital facilities in the kingdom, the likelihood of retaliation and regional escalation increased.
Human Losses Between Reported Figures and Information Blackouts
The most widely circulated figure by the end of September 8 came from an Agence France-Presse tally based on military and medical sources on both sides of the conflict: more than 500 people killed in one week, comprising 278 Houthis, 216 members of government forces, and at least 29 civilians.
The Associated Press, however, published a toll of 194 killed and more than 880 injured in the latest wave of escalation. The discrepancy may reflect differences in the time periods and geographic areas covered, as well as whether the figures include deaths across all fronts and from airstrikes.
The parties do not publish complete lists, and it is difficult to verify the bodies of those killed in Houthi-controlled areas or government losses across scattered locations. Both tolls remain attributed to their respective sources; they cannot be added together or treated individually as a definitive record of all casualties from the fighting.
Civilians and Displacement Under Fire
The repercussions of the escalation extended to villages, residential neighborhoods, and displacement camps, leaving people dead and injured and triggering new waves of displacement. On September 4, the government-run Saba channel reported civilian casualties from a ballistic missile strike on a restaurant at the Mokha junction. The following day, media outlets, citing medical sources quoted by Saba, reported that four civilians had been killed and nine injured in a ballistic missile strike in southern Taiz.
Villages and neighborhoods in Jabal Habashi and Maqbanah came under shelling and sniper fire, while hundreds of families fled villages in Hays and Al-Khawkhah in Hodeidah governorate.
According to the Executive Unit for the Management of IDP Camps, the number of displaced families in the two districts reached 790 by September 6, including 476 in Hays and 314 in Al-Khawkhah.
In Marib, a Houthi attack struck Asdas displacement camp in Raghwan district on the evening of September 7, killing a seven-year-old boy and a five-year-old girl and injuring 15 people, including eight children. Sixteen housing units and three cars were also damaged, and 23 families in the camp were left in urgent need of shelter, exposing families who had already fled the war to the risk of displacement once again.
UN data reveal the widening scale of displacement as fighting intensifies. The International Organization for Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix recorded 2,250 households, comprising 13,500 individuals, displaced at least once between August 30 and September 5.
This tally is limited to the period and areas covered by the monitoring and does not reflect subsequent waves of displacement, suggesting that humanitarian needs are likely to rise as fighting and bombardment continue.
The Government’s Position and the UN Appeal
The government said its forces in Taiz, Hodeidah, Al-Bayda, and Al-Jawf had participated in simultaneous counterattacks, and that coordination between the army and military formations had enabled them to regain the initiative on some fronts.
Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi praised the gains on the ground and affirmed the determination to extend state authority. Meanwhile, on September 6, the Defense Ministry ordered heightened readiness, the consolidation of positions, and the securing of recaptured areas.
For his part, UN envoy Hans Grundberg warned that recent Houthi attacks on several fronts had intensified clashes and could herald a widening of the conflict. He called on the parties to cease all hostilities, exercise maximum restraint, and use existing channels, including the Military Coordination Committee. The appeal came at a point when the fighting had already exceeded the pattern of limited violations that prevailed after 2022.
What the Parties Have Achieved So Far
Militarily, the Houthis have not achieved a decisive objective in western Taiz or along the coast, despite extensive mobilization, heavy firepower, and substantial losses. They likely managed to hold a limited number of hills for varying periods and forced government forces into significant attrition and the deployment of reinforcements. However, they did not cut the Taiz–Mokha road or make a significant advance toward Bab al-Mandab, which the government says is the militia’s principal objective in these operations. Government forces, meanwhile, made tactical gains in Al-Khazzan, Al-Makahinah, Hayfan, and Hays, and advanced in Al-Labanat in Al-Jawf and areas of Al-Bayda. Yet they have not translated these gains into a comprehensive strategic breakthrough, and these areas may remain vulnerable to another attack.
Politically, the Houthis broadened the scope of their messaging by striking Saudi Arabia. However, the attack could push Riyadh toward more overt military support and increase regional backing for a response to the group’s attacks. The government, for its part, benefited from simultaneous operations across multiple fronts to demonstrate a greater capacity for coordination. Yet it still faces the challenge of consolidating positions, unifying operations rooms, securing supply routes, and protecting civilians and displacement camps.
Outlook for the Fighting
Attrition is likely to continue if the parties fail to turn localized gains into lasting control. The Houthis may maintain pressure on Al-Kadhah, Maqbanah, and the roads to Mokha, while government forces seek to consolidate their positions and broaden pressure in Al-Jawf and Al-Bayda. The course of the fighting will depend on the ability of the various formations to coordinate and secure supplies, as well as the extent of direct Saudi involvement, particularly after the recent attacks.
With threats to the coast, navigation, and Saudi facilities continuing, the UN envoy’s appeal remains a test of mediation’s ability to contain the escalation. As of September 8, the most prominent outcome was the expansion of the fighting and its rising human cost, while the overall front lines remained largely unchanged and neither side had achieved a decisive advance.
