The latest military escalation on Yemen’s western coast is no longer merely a shift in the map of territorial control between the Houthis and government forces. The rapid advance of the Iran-backed group toward the city of Mokha and its port, followed by the extension of its movements southward toward Dhubab and its arrival on Mayyun Island in the heart of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, has elevated the Yemeni war to a level more closely linked to the security of international navigation, energy exports, and the broader regional conflict.
These developments are exceptionally significant because of their timing. At a time when shipping and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz are facing severe restrictions because of the regional war, the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab have become increasingly important as an alternative route for Gulf energy exports, particularly those of Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the advance of an armed force allied with Iran along the Yemeni side of Bab al-Mandab has become part of an equation that extends beyond Yemeni territory to competition over trade and energy routes around the Arabian Peninsula.
Within days of large-scale fighting, the Houthis made military gains on the ground, seizing vast areas and strategic locations on the western coast in what represents the most significant change in Yemen’s conflict map in years. The fighting expanded from the fronts in western Taiz and southern Hodeidah, with the group taking control of the highlands of Mawza and Al-Wazi’iyah, Khalid Camp, the Mokha Junction, and Jabal al-Nar, before entering Mokha and establishing a presence at its Red Sea port.
At a later stage, the movements extended south of Mokha toward Dhubab, opposite Mayyun Island, while Houthi forces reached the island in the middle of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, alongside movements toward several Red Sea islands.
The UN envoy to Yemen had warned against the seizure of Mokha, which he said would give the Houthis a direct presence along the routes leading to one of the world’s most important maritime straits, at a time when the military fronts remain fluid and susceptible to further changes.
From the Coast to the Strait
The strategic value of the latest advance lies more in geography than in the size of the territory that changed hands.
Bab al-Mandab forms the southern gateway to the Red Sea, linking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden with the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. Mayyun Island lies in the middle of the strait, dividing the passage into two shipping channels, while Dhubab is located directly opposite it on the Yemeni coast.
The Houthi presence in Mokha, Dhubab, and Mayyun gives the group a position entirely different from its previous presence in the northern Red Sea. Instead of relying primarily on areas in Hodeidah and the northern coast to launch missiles, drones, and attack boats, it now has positions closer to the narrow route through which ships pass at the entrance to the Red Sea.
However, control of these locations does not automatically mean that the Houthis are capable of imposing complete military control over Bab al-Mandab. The strait is an open international waterway, surrounded by regional and international naval forces whose aerial, maritime, and technological capabilities surpass those of the group. Moreover, attempting to close it militarily and permanently would be very different from carrying out intermittent attacks against ships and could open the door to broader military intervention.
Therefore, the main danger does not necessarily lie in the Houthis’ ability to “close” Bab al-Mandab, but in their ability to increase the level of risk associated with passing through it.
There Is No Need to Close the Sea
The Red Sea experience of recent years has shown that disrupting international trade does not require complete control over a maritime passage. Launching a missile or drone at a ship, or targeting a limited number of tankers, may be enough to prompt shipping companies to change their routes, raise insurance premiums, increase transportation costs, and add days or weeks to voyages forced to go around the Cape of Good Hope instead of passing through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
From this perspective, the new Houthi gain is measured not only by the amount of territory under the group’s control, but also by the expansion of the area from which it can deploy surveillance and targeting tools, missiles, drones, and coastal systems.
The closer launch and surveillance sites are to the maritime passage, the shorter the distances the weapons must cover, the wider the range of targeting options becomes, and the more difficult it is for shipping companies to ignore the threat—even if actual attacks do not occur daily. Consequently, possessing the ability to threaten may, in some cases, carry strategic value comparable to carrying out the threat itself.
Why Has Bab al-Mandab Become More Important Now?
Energy-flow figures reveal the scale of the change in Bab al-Mandab’s importance over recent months. In the second quarter of 2026, the average volume of oil and petroleum products passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait reached approximately 8.1 million barrels per day, compared with about 5.4 million barrels per day in the final quarter of 2025.
During the same period, flows through the Strait of Hormuz fell sharply, from more than 21 million barrels per day throughout most of 2025 to around 4.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter of the current year. The increase through Bab al-Mandab is partly linked to Saudi Arabia’s redirection of oil volumes through the East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu in order to reduce its dependence on Hormuz. These figures explain a significant part of the regional importance of the developments in Yemen.
When energy traffic through Hormuz becomes disrupted, the importance of alternative waterways and pipelines automatically increases. Consequently, heightened risks in Bab al-Mandab, coinciding with a reduced ability to use Hormuz, could place Gulf energy exports between two pressure points to the east and west.
Iran and Two Straits on Either Side of the Arabian Peninsula
From a regional perspective, it is difficult to separate the Houthi advance from the environment created by the confrontation between Iran and the United States. Iran lies along the northern coast of the Strait of Hormuz and possesses direct military capabilities to influence shipping within it. On the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, the Houthis possess an arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, and naval weapons that have already been used against ships in the Red Sea.
This creates an unprecedented geographical situation: Iran’s main force near the eastern energy passage, and its ally, the Houthi group, in advanced positions near the western passage.
This does not necessarily mean that Tehran controls every military decision made by the Houthis, or that operations in Yemen are managed entirely from abroad. Over the course of the war, the group has developed into a military and political actor with its own domestic calculations.
However, the longstanding military and technological relationship between the two sides, combined with the timing of the latest advance amid the regional confrontation, gives the Houthi gains direct strategic value for Iran, regardless of the extent of its involvement in the details of battlefield decision-making.
Every increase in the level of risk within Bab al-Mandab places greater pressure on Iran’s adversaries, heightens the sensitivity of energy markets, and forces the United States and its allies to distribute more military resources between the Gulf and the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia Between Hormuz and the Red Sea
Saudi Arabia appears to be among the countries most affected by this equation. One of the central elements of Riyadh’s strategy for dealing with the risks surrounding Hormuz is the East-West Pipeline, which transports oil from fields in the Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. From there, tankers can sail toward the Suez Canal or global markets without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
However, this advantage depends, in turn, on the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab for ships heading south.
The movement of the Houthi threat into areas closer to the strait could therefore partially reduce the advantage provided by bypassing Hormuz and confront Riyadh with two simultaneous challenges: protecting its territory and oil facilities from attacks, and securing energy export routes through the Red Sea.
This makes the war in Yemen more closely connected than ever to Saudi national security and global energy security.
A New Dilemma for Washington
For the United States, the development presents an equally complex dilemma. Freedom of navigation in Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea is a direct American interest, not only because of the movement of US vessels, but also because of the strait’s connection to the Suez Canal, European markets, energy supplies, and the stability of Washington’s allies in the region.
However, any direct expansion of US military involvement in Yemen would mean adding a new theater to an already ongoing regional confrontation.
Conversely, ignoring the Houthi expansion carries its own risks. The more the group succeeds in consolidating its presence along the coast and on islands near the strait, the more costly it will become to dislodge it later. The new positions could also be developed, fortified, and used as platforms in future rounds of escalation.
The issue, therefore, is no longer limited to preventing an attack on a ship. It now also involves preventing the emergence of a long-term strategic reality that would allow an Iran-aligned force to retain a permanent capacity to threaten the gateway to the Red Sea.
What Can the Houthis Actually Do?
Despite the latest gains, it is important not to exaggerate the group’s capabilities. The Houthis are capable of launching missiles and drones at maritime targets, using attack boats and floating explosives, and imposing a high level of risk on commercial shipping. Their new position may also help them expand maritime surveillance and targeting activities. However, they do not possess a conventional naval force capable of exercising complete control over the waters surrounding the strait when confronted by major naval powers.
Herein lies the difference between controlling Bab al-Mandab and having the ability to threaten Bab al-Mandab.
The former requires sustained naval and aerial superiority and the ability to prevent others from using the passage. The latter requires far less: missiles, drones, information about vessel movements, nearby launch sites, and the political will to use them. The current danger lies primarily in the second possibility.
The Yemeni Cost of Regional Expansion
While international attention is focused on ships, oil, and Bab al-Mandab, Yemeni civilians are paying the direct price of the military shift. Since the beginning of September, the fighting has spread from the western coast to Taiz, Marib, Al-Jawf, and Al-Bayda, triggering a large wave of displacement. By September 11, at least 46,000 people had been displaced since the escalation began, with the number continuing to rise and humanitarian needs expanding.
This places Yemen—after years of relative calm following the 2022 truce—at risk of entering a new cycle of large-scale war, but within a regional environment more dangerous than in previous phases.
What Will Determine the Next Phase?
The impact of the Houthi advance will not be determined merely by the group’s arrival in Mokha or Mayyun, but by what happens next. If the group succeeds in consolidating its new positions, deploying coastal weapons, surveillance systems, and air defenses there, and securing supply lines between Hodeidah, Mokha, and areas farther south, the latest gains will become a long-term strategic shift.
If, however, government forces and their allies manage to reorganize their lines and launch a counteroffensive to retake the areas adjacent to the strait, the current developments could become a temporary gain rather than a permanent reality.
In either case, the battle has revealed a reality that is difficult to ignore: the Yemeni war is no longer separate from the struggle over the region’s maritime passages.
From Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab
The most important change brought about by the Houthi offensive is not merely the addition of a city or an island to the group’s map of control, but its movement closer to a position that gives its weapons and political influence far greater value than before.
At a time when navigation through Hormuz is facing unprecedented disruption, any simultaneous threat to Bab al-Mandab doubles the pressure on global energy routes and gives Iran and its allies an additional means of raising the cost of confrontation for the United States and its partners.
Therefore, the main question following the latest developments is not whether the Houthis “control the Red Sea,” as that description exceeds their actual capabilities.
The more precise question is: Have the Houthis managed to establish a geographical and military position that allows them to make Bab al-Mandab unsafe whenever they choose?
The answer is now closer to “yes” than it was just weeks ago. That shift alone is enough to make what is happening on Yemen’s western coast an issue that extends beyond the future of the Yemeni war to encompass energy security, international trade, and the calculations of the United States and Iran in the Middle East.
