More than two weeks after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) took control of the provinces of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, in Yemen’s far east, the repercussions of this move have gone beyond the scope of military deployment to reveal a complex crisis with political, security, and humanitarian dimensions, in a country already burdened by a war that has dragged on for more than a decade. Recent field developments have not led to a reordering of the security situation as promoted by their backers; instead, they have plunged the country into a new impasse that raises fundamental questions about state authority, unity of decision-making, and the limits of regional influence.
This step came as part of a broader path adopted by the STC to expand its control in southern and eastern Yemen, within the context of an openly declared secessionist political project. Developments quickly turned into a state of military and political deadlock, amid the Council’s refusal to withdraw its forces from the areas it seized in early December, despite local, governmental, and popular pressure, alongside Saudi efforts that began from day one through a field delegation that held extensive meetings with various parties.
Expanding Influence by Force
On December 3, STC forces, backed by the United Arab Emirates, took control of military and security sites and government institutions in Wadi Hadramawt and Al-Mahra province, marking a qualitative shift that reshaped the map of control in the country’s east. This move broke existing security arrangements, disrupted a fragile balance between local forces and government troops, and opened the door to armed clashes and unprecedented social tensions in provinces that had, until recently, remained relatively distant from direct frontlines.
This expansion also reflected a direct extension of the struggle for influence within the anti-Houthi camp, with all the attendant repercussions for its cohesion and its ability to manage security and political priorities.
Human Losses and Documented Violations
The escalation was accompanied by the killing and wounding of dozens during the first days, including civilians, soldiers, and members of local tribal committees in Hadramawt who had declared their rejection of bringing in forces from outside the province. The General Staff of the Armed Forces announced the death of 32 soldiers from the First Military Region who were killed in attacks in areas of Wadi and Desert Hadramawt, in addition to dozens of civilians.
In parallel, human rights organizations and centers documented widespread violations, including the storming of civilian institutions and health facilities, the detention of civilians, and assaults targeting residents from northern provinces, in addition to reports of the execution of wounded individuals and detainees. Rights-based estimates indicated that around 76 people were killed in the course of the operations, amid the rise of inciteful rhetoric that deepened social polarization and raised serious fears of the situation sliding into broader communal confrontations.
Official Position and Warning Against Undermining the State
In response to these developments, the Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad Al-Alimi, stressed his rejection of what he described as “unilateral measures” in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, considering them to undermine state authority, dismantle the constitutional and institutional foundation, and open internal fronts that Yemen cannot afford at this stage. He called for the withdrawal of forces brought in from outside the two provinces and for enabling local authorities to perform their duties in accordance with the constitution and the law.
Al-Alimi warned of the economic and security repercussions of the escalation, noting that the security deterioration in the east of the country had led to the suspension of vital international programs, including activities and projects of the International Monetary Fund, which would negatively affect living conditions and basic services.
In this context, the leadership of the local authority in Hadramawt called for de-escalation and for the departure of forces coming from outside the province, from which official military formations had withdrawn, as had occurred in other provinces controlled by the STC for years. The alliance of political parties and parliament joined these calls, warning of the risks of continued escalation to the unity of the state and holding coalition countries responsible for restoring the situation to what it was before the recent developments.
Faltering Attempts
Since early December, a Saudi delegation has been permanently present in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, conducting direct contacts with local authorities, parliamentarians, military, religious, and tribal leaders, and social components, in an attempt to contain the escalation and rearrange the security situation. Despite the passage of more than two weeks, no tangible results have been recorded regarding the withdrawal or redeployment of STC forces, reflecting a clear impasse so far in mediation efforts and the limited ability to impose binding outcomes and restore state authority.
The Saudi delegation, headed by Major General Mohammed Al-Qahtani, has stressed its rejection of any attempts to impose a fait accompli or create military formations outside the framework of the state, affirming that its moves aim at de-escalation, restoring security, and enabling the people of Hadramawt to manage their own affairs.
In parallel, on Friday evening, a joint Saudi–Emirati military delegation arrived in the interim capital Aden to discuss arrangements for the withdrawal of STC forces from the eastern regions, according to local and Saudi media. However, the Southern Council was quick to deny these reports, a stance interpreted as a political message underscoring its adherence to the fait accompli and rejection of any negotiating track that would end with a military rollback.
Consolidating the Fait Accompli and Building a Parallel Authority
The STC’s move has not been limited to military control, but has extended to administrative and political steps aimed at entrenching a new reality. These included imposing different security arrangements, interfering in the work of local institutions, and making appointments in vital facilities, particularly in Al-Mahra province and its land and sea ports. This trajectory reflects an organized approach to transferring control from the military field to the level of administration and local decision-making.
In this context, STC President Aidarous Al-Zubaidi issued a decision to form what he called the “Preparatory Committee for the Southern Fatwa Authority,” in a step considered a further expansion in the creation of parallel institutions that do not stop at security and administrative aspects but extend into the religious sphere, carrying profound political and sovereign implications.
Strategic Dimensions and Future Risks
Hadramawt and Al-Mahra hold immense strategic importance due to their vast geographic area, their location bordering Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the provinces of Marib and Al-Jawf, as well as their oil resources and vital outlets that represent economic lifelines for the country. Any long-term change in the balance of control there would mean a reshaping of economic and political equilibria, with a direct impact on prospects for settlement and the future of the Yemeni state.
Observers believe that the continued control of an armed faction outside the framework of the state, without legal cover or national consensus, threatens to entrench a model of “functional fragmentation” of the state, whereby central authority gradually erodes in favor of de facto entities exercising full sovereign powers without an official declaration of secession. This opens the door to social and tribal tensions in areas that have long expressed rejection of any externally imposed military presence.
The current crisis or conflict in Al-Mahra and Hadramawt is no longer merely a security dispute or temporary military arrangements; it has turned into a real test of the ability of the Presidential Leadership Council and the internationally recognized government to survive fragmentation, and of the effectiveness of the Saudi role in rearranging the landscape inside Yemen.
Between human losses and documented violations, faltering mediation, and unilateral steps to entrench a parallel authority, eastern Yemen stands at a decisive crossroads that may shape the contours of the next phase—not only for the two provinces, but for Yemen’s future as a whole.
