


UN Special Envoys and the Crisis in Yemen

2011 - 2021



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Abstract

The current study sheds light on the UN and the crisis in Yemen (2011-2021). It mainly focuses on the roles of the UN special envoys for Yemen, starting with, Jamal Benomar (2011-2015), Ismaïl Ould Cheikh Ahmed, (2015-2018), and Martin Griffiths, (2018-2021). This study illustrates the mechanisms used by the UN for mediation and its management of the conflict in Yemen. It focuses on the most important international resolutions issued by the UN Security Council, the initiatives launched by the UN envoys, and the political agreements concluded between the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the Houthi movement under the auspices of the UN. In addition to this, this study deals with the reasons for the failure of these initiatives and agreements, and identifies the difficulties faced by the UN Special envoys for Yemen.

The research revolves around the factors that led to the inability of the UN to find a comprehensive political settlement to the crisis in Yemen since its mediation began in 2011, the obstacles it faced, and what could result from its inability to achieve any substantial progress regarding the crisis in Yemen during the next phase.

The study is intended to describe the role of the UN in Yemen since 2011 until today, revealing the factors that led to its inability to achieve sustainable peace, and to briefly shed light on the role of each envoy. To achieve these goals, the study used historical, analytical, and descriptive methods to analyze the content of some political agreements sponsored by the UN.

The study raises the following questions: What role did the United Nations envoys play in Yemen? And why their attempts during the past decade did not succeed in building a durable peace? Why did the process of democratic transition in Yemen fail during UN's presence as a mediator and supervisor? What are the reasons that led to the disapplication of the initiatives and agreements signed under the auspices of the UN envoys for Yemen? Herein lies the critical importance of the study in revealing the reasons that led to the inability of the UN to achieve a comprehensive peace.

The topics of the study are as following: the first subsection discusses the period of the UN envoy, Jamal Benomar (2011-2015), and the events, dialogues and agreements that took place during his period. The second subsection addresses the consultations, sponsored by the UN, as well as the initiatives launched by the second envoy, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, (2015-2018). The third topic concentrates on the period of the UN special envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths,(2018-2021), and touched on the reasons and factors that led to the non-implementation of the agreements during his period, and the difficulties he faced. Additionally, the study examines the difficulties facing the current UN special envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg.

Keywords: United Nations, Yemen Crisis, Gulf Initiative, Agreements, National Dialogue, Envoys.

Introduction

The UN is an international organization founded at the end of World War II in 1945. Currently it's made up of 193 Member States. the UN's work is guided by the purposes and principles in its founding Charter.⁽¹⁾ Its main system consists of the General Assembly, and the Security Council which is one of its functions “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,”⁽²⁾ in addition to some other councils in the economic, social, and justice fields. The Security Council, which is the highest authority in the global system, is made up of five permanent members: (USA, UK, France, China, and Russia), as well as some ten non-permanent members, but the five permanent members hold the veto power.

Any crisis is a concern for the global decision-makers. “However, what is new in the post-Cold War era lies in the search for controlling conflicts by working to prevent them before they occur in order to avoid crises, in what is called Preventive Diplomacy.”⁽³⁾ According to this strategy, the UN intervened to solve the Yemeni crisis.

During the past decade, the Republic of Yemen went through a complex phase of military and political conflicts, while the UN was unable to establish sustainable peace in Yemen. Hence, the study of the UN special envoys for Yemen

(1) About the United Nation, accessed: (23 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/wm7ofb0>

(2) United Nations Charter (full text), accessed: (July 18, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/WmXK1Ti>

(3) Fatima Ghelman, Collective Diplomacy: Respecting the Sovereignty of States and Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes, SIYASAT ARABIYA, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, No. (15), 2015, p. 75.

and the Yemen crisis since the revolution of February 11, 2011 until today is fundamentally needed to investigate the reasons why the UN's mediation in Yemen has stumbled over the past decade.

In this sense, discussing the historical background of the UN's role in Yemen objectively is an important methodological point of view. It is noted that knowledge of the role of the UN mediation in Yemeni crises since the 1960s is essential in every research effort aimed at understanding the role of the UN, the mechanisms used by the UN to mediate between the warring parties, and to understand these mechanisms, which did not lead to a political settlement, but rather deepened the roots of the conflict, and allowed the crisis to expand day by day. This means that any research effort must clarify the deficiencies. Are the UN mechanisms not fit to address the crisis? Is the UN's influence too limited? Is it the nations considered the major powers hold the actual control? Did the parties of the conflict played a negative role and prevented the UN from succeeding in resolving the Yemeni crisis? Or was it entirely the responsibility of the local parties who did not accept mediation, and thus, a political solution, and they preferred a military solution that acted as a barrier to peace?

The study aspires to clarify these questions, and then find alternative approaches for solving the Yemeni crisis. From this point of view, it is necessary to focus on the mediation of the UN in Yemen in a scientific way, especially since the conflict in Yemen has become one of the most complex conflicts in the region, and there are several local actors that have emerged recently which further complicates the already arduous efforts to establish a political solution.

The Concept of UN Mediation

The focus of the study of mediation, its principles, development, and methods, began in the fifties and sixties of the last century in the United States with the aim of furthering the effective means to resolve and manage labor disputes.⁽⁴⁾ Mediation means a third party intervening to mediate between the parties to the conflict, with the aim of resolving the dispute between the two parties to the conflict to reach a comprehensive political settlement and reconciliation. The mediator must be positively neutral, does not take sides, and has sufficient knowledge of the roots of the conflict in order to be able to find appropriate solutions to the crisis.

The UN confirms that “mediation support is a distinct function entailing reinforcement and assistance in facilitating the work of the team, and besides local-level dialogues and peace initiatives can provide a basis for and act as a complement to a formal peace process.”⁽⁵⁾ Mediation can play a positive role in settling disputes if the person carrying it out abides by the rules of mediation. It can play a positive role in resolving disputes if those who do it adhere to mediation controls. And “effective mediation requires a supportive external environment; most conflicts have a strong regional and international dimension,”⁽⁶⁾ as it is happening in Yemen today.

⁽⁴⁾ Munira Al-Sultan, Mediation: A key tool in the implementation of the Kuwaiti Foreign Policy, in the Arab and Islamic world, Master Thesis, (Faculty of Arts, Middle East University, 2012), p. 1.

⁽⁵⁾ United Nations Activities in Support of Mediation, (Report of the Secretary-General, A/72/115 27 June 2017), p 9, 13.

⁽⁶⁾ United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, report of the Secretary-General on Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution (A/66/811, 2012), p 5.

The regional and international dimension of the Yemeni conflict is not new but has existed the conflict between Egypt and Saudi Arabia broke in the 1960s. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were locking horns over Yemen. The UN then intervened as an intermediary to break up the conflict. Thus, the role of the UN mediation in Yemen is not new. It's mediation efforts began between different warring parties in Yemen early on. The UN sent its special envoy the Nobel Prize-winning diplomat Ralph Bunche to Yemen in the 1960s, and the Algerian, Lakhdar Brahimi, as a special envoy for Yemen when the conflict broke out between the partners of the Yemeni unification in 1994. ⁽⁷⁾

Today, more than one regional party is involved in the conflict in Yemen, most notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other regional States are involved in the conflict in an undisclosed manner. Between 2011 and 2021, the UN Secretaries-General have sent three special envoys for Yemen, yet, they could not convince regional powers or local parties to the conflict of the need for a political settlement that would preserve the interests of all local and regional parties. During this period, it seems that the UN did not have a clear normative framework for mediation, which remained open without a specific time limit.

⁽⁷⁾ The UN has been in Yemen early on. The first UNSCR No: 29 was issued in August 1947, which included the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen 1918-1962) to the membership of the UN. The UNSCR No: 243 issued in December, 1967, it provided for the inclusion of the Democratic Republic of Yemen (what was known as South Yemen, November 30, 1967-May 21, 1990) to the membership of the UN. The UNSCR No: (179) was issued in June 1963, regarding the Yemeni revolution that erupted on September 26, 1962, against the rule of Imam Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid al-Din (1948-1962), and led to the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic. In addition to this, the Secretary-General at that time, U Thant (1961-1971) had appointed the Nobel Prize-winning, Ralph Bunche a special envoy for Yemen. He had tried to persuade Egypt and Saudi Arabia to withdraw from the conflict in Yemen.

The UNSCR No. 188 was issued in April 1964, regarding the Yemeni Arab Republic's complaint against the British air attack on its territory. After the Yemeni unification took place on May 22, 1990, UNSCR No. 924 was issued on June 1994, and called for a cease-fire between the two warring parties. At that time, Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996) sent the Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, as special envoy for Yemen. In less than a month, another UNSCR No. 931 was issued calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. For additional information, you can visit, Yemen in the UN agenda. 12 Resolutions in 70 Years (Framework), Anadolu Agency, published June 12, 2020, accessed: (July 16, 2021), at <https://cutt.ly/QmKjleR>

Part I

Jamal Benomar:

The Gulf Initiative to the Decisive Storm

(2011-2015)

At the beginning of 2011, Yemenis rejoiced at the UN mediation to get Yemen out of the crisis and successfully conduct the transitional process, especially since the UN was backed by Yemenis, Arab, and international political consensus. It could have pressured the political parties and the armed Houthi movement to respect and implement the GCC initiative, if it had placed real pressure at that time.

“UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon first dispatched Benomar to Yemen in April 2011.”⁽⁸⁾ Jamal Benomar ⁽⁹⁾ was granted political asylum in Britain, then held its citizenship. The appointment of Jamal Benomar as an official special envoy for Yemen was in August 2012,⁽¹⁰⁾ following the popular revolution that erupted in the country on February 11, 2011 ⁽¹¹⁾calling on Ali Abdallah Saleh ⁽¹²⁾ to step down as president. The period of Jamal Benomar (2011-2015) can be divided into three important phases: his supervision of the GCC initiative, the Yemeni National

⁽⁸⁾ Peter Salisbury and Tik Root, Jamal Benomar and the Fine Art of Making Peace in Yemen, The Atlantic Council, Published on June 17, 2014, accessed: (July 16, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/4mLFQWF>

⁽⁹⁾ “Mr. Benomar worked in a variety of capacities since he joined the United Nations in 1993, including with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Department of Political Affairs. He also served in Afghanistan and Iraq as the Secretary-General Envoy to support the National Dialogue Conference in 2004. Prior to his career with the United Nations, Mr. Benomar was a director at the Carter Center where he worked closely with former United States President Jimmy Carter on human rights and mediation issues. He has also worked for Amnesty International in London.” (<https://cutt.ly/Nm5Fw6R>)

⁽¹⁰⁾ Jamal Benomar, Al Jazeera Net, published on December 01, 2014, accessed: (August 10, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/wQUfNiz>

⁽¹¹⁾ “In late January 2011—after a popular uprising in Tunisia, known as the Jasmine Revolution, had ousted Pres. Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, inspiring similar protests in Egypt where thousands of protesters gathered in Sanaa and several other Yemeni cities to call on Saleh to step down as president. The protesters chanted pro-democracy slogans and condemned poverty and official corruption. Uprising.” For more information visit this site: (<https://cutt.ly/GmLGDZ2>)

⁽¹²⁾ “Ali Abdallah Saleh 21 March 1947-4 December 2017) was a Yemeni politician who served as the first President of Yemen, from Yemeni unification on 22 May 1990 to his resignation on 25 February 2012, following the Yemeni Revolution. Previously, he had served as President of the Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen, from July 1978 to 22 May 1990.”

Dialogue Conference (YNDC), and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA).

1- Jamal Benomar's Supervision of the Mechanism of the GCC Initiative

In the beginning of 2011, Yemenis from 16 governorates took to the streets demanding justice and solutions for the dwindling economy. The situation kept escalating and the protesters called on Saleh to step down as president. At that time, the Yemeni president felt his inability to confront the masses, and for this reason he tried to find a kind of political settlement with the opposition parties (the Joint Meeting). However, the opposition did not stop the demonstrations despite an escalating situation. Like previous crises, “the latest crisis in Yemen led to growing concern among Saudi ruling elites about the developments.”⁽¹³⁾

Saudi Arabia felt the seriousness of the situation in Yemen, so it diplomatically and politically intervened to protect its interests. “The UN, with the assistance of the GCC countries, led an agreement to transfer power.”⁽¹⁴⁾ Thus, the UN, and the GCC countries in general, sought a political deal between opposition parties and the regime of the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Of course, the GCC initiative sought to find a political settlement between the (GPC and its allies) and the opposition parties (JMP and their partners). “It set in motion an orderly transition process and prevented a looming civil war.”⁽¹⁵⁾ During the transitional phase, there were several military conflicts in the northern regions. The Houthi Movement was targeting the tribal areas one by one, and Al-

⁽¹³⁾ Irem. Karakir, Ongoing Conflict In Yemen: A Proxy War, Turkish Journal of Tesam Academy, (2), July 2018, p 130.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Afrah Nasser, The Growing Failure of the UN in Yemen, Rafic Hariri Center for the Middle East, published on September 22, 2017, accessed: (July 28, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/2Qu4xNS>

⁽¹⁵⁾ Popp. Roland, War in Yemen: Revolution and Saudi Intervention, (CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 2015), p 1.

Qaeda was trying to expand in eastern and southern Yemen, especially in Abyan and other areas. In fact, the GCC initiative is one of the previous agreements that concentrated on the interests of the conflicting local political parties and external players. It has ignored public interests and citizens' rights as well as addressing the root causes of the crisis. Hence, it has not been successful. In addition, the former regime of Ali Saleh and the opposition parties as well rushed to accept the initiative because of the international and regional pressure.

The initiative stipulated that president Ali Abdullah Saleh would step down from power to the vice president. Under the initiative, “a government of national unity was formed with 50 percent from each side, the GPC and its allies, and the JMP and their partners.”⁽¹⁶⁾ The executive mechanism of the initiative stated that “after the early Presidential elections, the newly elected President and the Government of national unity shall exercise all of their customary functions as set forth in the Constitution. In addition, they shall exercise the powers necessary to continue the tasks specified for the implementation of the first phase, and additional tasks specified for the second phase of the transfer of power.”⁽¹⁷⁾

The political transition was not executed properly; due to the unwillingness of some of the signatories to the initiative, including former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to implement it, which hindered the unification of the army and security institutions. Al-Saqqaf asserts that "former president Ali Abdullah Saleh was conducting extensive consultations with the Houthi movement and the Southern separatist movement, in order to form a united front with an Iranian

⁽¹⁶⁾ The Amended GCC Initiative, Al Jazeera, published on 02, December 2014, accessed: (July 08, 2021), at:

<https://cutt.ly/sf80Zo4>

⁽¹⁷⁾ Yemen Mechanism English Official.doc, Agreement on the implementation mechanism for the transition process in Yemen in accordance with the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), published on 05 November 2011, p 6-7.

support to face the growing influence of the Islah party and its ally Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. Perhaps the main factor in the rapprochement between these actors is their non-acceptance of the political transitional process.”⁽¹⁸⁾ The immunity granted to Ali Saleh and his entourage by the GCC initiative, in addition to his control of the most security and armed forces has helped him in carrying out this political action. It is obvious that the immunity made him politically active without fear of any legal or political consequences.

It is clear that Jamal Benomar did not pressure those who were obstructing the political settlement, including those who did not sign the GCC initiative, but was trying to appease them at the expense of the political process. Among these parties are the Separatist Movement and the al-Houthi movement, an armed group that appeared militarily in Sa’ada in 2004 during a conflict with the Yemeni government. “The Houthi movement seeks to rule as the right of the Hashemite sect, and the imam must be from the family of Ahl al-Bayt. This theocratic theory is based on the jurisprudence of the Zaydi branch of Islam, to which Houthis belong. This branch rejects democracy and the peaceful exchange of power through elections. In the political thought of the Houthi movement, there is no need for democracy in Yemen, and there lies the root of the problem.”⁽¹⁹⁾

As mentioned above, the GCC initiative was between the GPC and its allies and the JMP and their partners, and this made the armed movements including the Houthis reject the initiative, and to exploit the deteriorating conditions during the transitional phase and bounce on the entire political transition process. Nadwa Al-Dawsari confirms that “the GCC initiative focused primarily on resolving the

⁽¹⁸⁾ Omar Al-Saqqaf, Yemen: Conflicting Agendas at a Decisive Dialogue Table, (Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2012), p. 6.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Adel Dashela, and Afrah Al-Akhali, The Political Thought of Yemen’s Houthi Center for Yemeni Studies) p. 9.

Movement, Washington

conflict between traditional political elites from the northern part of the country rather than grievances from other regions, many actors felt disenfranchised.”⁽²⁰⁾

Moreover, Jamal Benomar did not pressure the former Yemeni president, and did not even condemn his military moves during the transitional phase. But, recently, he accused in his interview on Aljazeera’s program Without Borders on 24 March-2021 “that the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh was the one who facilitated the Houthi’s control of the capital, Sanaa, after reassuring them that there was no resistance to their movements because he was in control of the army and the security forces, even after he left the presidency.”⁽²¹⁾

The UN envoy continued to mediate between the formal actors, and later between the formal actors and the armed Houthi movement, and did not deal with other traditional, informal actors such as tribal sheikhs. Since Yemen is a country that takes pride in following its traditions, and the centralized system was fragile, informal traditional actors have an important role in any political settlement; where “traditional leaders, such as Sheikhs, have historically been highly respected and influential among Yemeni communities. As such, they have been able to act as effective conflict mediators are keen to foster social cohesion.”⁽²²⁾ However, these traditional leaders were marginalized during the transitional phase, and some of them were loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Houthi movement exploited the anger of these leaders against the rise of oil and diesel prices, and later they partnered with the Houthis to bring down the Government of National Unity.

⁽²⁰⁾ Nadwa Al-Dawsari, How diplomacy failed in Yemen and why it will again, published on 11- May, 2017, accessed: (July 29, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/ynJTEie>

⁽²¹⁾ Jamal Benomar: The entry of Houthis to Sana’a is a sin, carried out in coordination with Saleh, “Without Borders Program,” Al-Jazeera channel, published on March 24, 2021, accessed: (July 19, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/HmC4oKy>

⁽²²⁾ SHOQI MAKTARY and KATIE SMITH, PATHWAYS FOR PEACE& STABILITY IN YEMEN, (Search for Common Ground, 2017), p 33.

Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh also contributed to a large extent to mobilizing the tribes with the aim of failing the transitional government.

Moreover, the international donors ignored the economic situation by focusing on the political situation. Although there were some donor conferences like the conference held on September 4, 2012, in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, and a group of 28 countries and international organizations pledged an estimate of 6.4 billion dollars to support the country during the transitional phase, after more than a year of turmoil and political conflicts. Saudi Arabia was the largest contributor to this aid with 3.25 billion dollars.⁽²³⁾ However, this assistance was not sufficient.

It is clear that the UN focused on the political transitional process and did not realize the seriousness of the deteriorating economic situation in spite of the UN's Charter clearly states "the specific role of the UN in addressing international economic and social problems"⁽²⁴⁾. However, the UN envoy proceeded by prioritizing the political issues and treating the economic concerns as secondary which indicates the lack of understanding of the roots of the Yemeni dilemma. Therefore, the process of peaceful transition failed. It is more likely that if the transitional government had been economically supported during 2012-2014, the socio-economic status of citizens would have improved, and the transition process would have taken place more effectively.

⁽²³⁾ Yemen: Basindawa Government Receiving Support from Donor Conference, Dw, Published on 04 September 2014, accessed: (10 August 2021), at:

⁽²⁴⁾ Hassan Nafaa, United Nations Reform in the Light of the Stalled March of Global System, 1st^{Ed}, (Arab House of Science Publishers, and Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2009), p. 91.

2- The UN Envoy and the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference NDC

The NDC was supervised by the UN envoy then, Jamal Benomar, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the ambassadors of the permanent members of the Security Council. Benomar was the one who indicated to president Hadi to accept the Houthis' participation in the NDC ⁽²⁵⁾ even before the group had to give up their weapons. The office of Benomar in Sana'a was monitoring the progress of the comprehensive national dialogue process, but Benomar did not seek the assistance of experts from Yemen to address the complexities of the Yemeni situation, but was satisfied with his experiences, although some foreign or even local experts who were working alongside him were not aware of the risks of the transitional phase.

On the other hand, "the leadership of the separatist movement... announced its rejection of the results of the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference." ⁽²⁶⁾ This refusal complicated the progress of the transitional phase and the entire political scene, especially when it took place during the rapid military expansion of the Houthi movement in the tribal areas in northern parts of Yemen. At the same time, the Houthi movement was insult to injury during the National Dialogue Conference and raising issues not related to the transitional phase and the political dialogue.

During the National Dialogue, the disarmament of the armed groups was not discussed. The Houthis were participating in the dialogue, while still keeping their heavy weapons. However, Benomar did not talk about the Houthis weapons during

⁽²⁵⁾ Ahmed Al-Sabahi, Jamal Benomar, Engineer of The fall of Sana'a, Al-Bayan Magazine, published on September 30, 2014, accessed: (July 24, 2021), <https://cutt.ly/om5HzXg>

⁽²⁶⁾ The separatists of the south reject the outcomes of the Yemeni NDC, Al Jazeera Net, published on September 27, 2013, accessed: (August 10, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/jQUkTVp>

the national dialogue, but rather “complicity with the forces obstructing the success of the dialogue, whether at the political and military level, or in provoking conflicts and expansionist wars in some governorates.”⁽²⁷⁾ Thus, the envoy, Benomar, had a negative role during the National Dialogue Conference; he did not pressure the Houthi movement to stop its military operations in the northern tribal areas, or declare any objection to its military acts, while the Houthis were blowing up the homes of political opponents, education centers, and the headquarters of political parties, and seizing state camps in Sa’ada, Amran and other areas.

The formation of the National Dialogue Conference hastily, and discussion the form of the civilian state, the federal system, as well as the draft of the new constitution, and the upcoming elections, without finding a mechanism for disarming armed groups, applying transitional justice in a correct manner, compensating the victims of previous conflicts as well as criminalizing racist ideas led to the failure of the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). The attempt to apply the experiences of other countries and bring them to Yemen through the application of the Federal System, without focusing on the nature of the Yemeni society and understanding its customs and traditions, had negative impact on the outcomes of the NDC, and ultimately led to its failure.

3- The Peace and National Partnership Agreement Sponsored by the President Hadi and the UN Envoy, Jamal Benomar

After the National Dialogue Conference was completed in early 2014, the Houthis continued waging wars against tribes in the governorates of (Amran,

⁽²⁷⁾ Musa Elayah and May Ajlan, the United Nations and the new Western UN envoy to Yemen: Can he be more effective than a former Arab envoy!, Analytical Paper, the Center for Governance and Peace building, (Sana’a, Yemen, 2018), p. 2.

Sa'ada, and Hajjah) until they captured the capital Sana'a militarily on September 21, 2014. At that time, the UN envoy, Jamal Benomar, pressurized the Yemeni parties to sign The Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA).⁽²⁸⁾ It was signed between the Yemeni political parties and the Houthi movement under the auspices of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and Jamal Benomar. The agreement called for the formation of a new government and detailed the military and security aspects. The Houthi movement agreed to implement the political aspect of the agreement, but it did not accept the implementation of the security and military aspects. This refusal led to the situation getting out of control.

After that, some dialogues took place at the Movenpick Hotel between the political parties and the Houthi movement. During the negotiations, "the Socialist Party proposed the idea of expanding the House of Representatives, while the Houthis proposed the national council, which would consist of 551 members. And the main political components of this council are: the GPC and its allies, the JMP and their partners, the Southern Movement, and the Houthi movement."⁽²⁹⁾ The negotiations failed because the Houthis have chosen the military option.

In fact, the Peace and National Partnership Agreement legitimized the armed coup of the Houthi movement and allowed it to expand militarily in the other governorates. The Houthi movement did not give any attention to international appeals and even UN Security resolution that demanded it to stop violence and to return to the political process. Rather, it continued its escalatory actions and "placed President Hadi under house arrest and declared their own constitution,

⁽²⁸⁾ The Peace and National Partnership Agreement 21 September 2014, accessed: (July 23, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/Im4NdCK>

⁽²⁹⁾ The latest results of the Movempick negotiations between Yemeni political forces, Mandeb Press, published on February 14, 2015, accessed: (August 10, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/IQUS3tb>

Benomar recognized the reality imposed by the Houthis and sounded the death knell of the transitional process.”⁽³⁰⁾

The Houthi rebels announced their constitutional declaration, which provided for the dissolution of the house of the parliament, the formation of a presidential council, and a transitional period of two years.⁽³¹⁾ After this constitutional declaration, events developed in a dramatic way where president Hadi came out from house arrest in Sana'a and headed to Aden, and the Houthi rebels targeted the presidential palace in Aden in an air raid⁽³²⁾. This led president Hadi to seek help from the regional powers especially Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia launched the “Decisive Storm”.⁽³³⁾ All these military and political events occurred during the presence of the UN envoy Jamal Benomar in the capital Sana'a.

A Study of the Security Council Resolutions issued during Benomar's Term

In fact, several UN Security Council resolutions were issued during Benomar's term as an international mediator. On October 2011, the international resolution No. 2014 was issued, “calling for implementation of a political settlement based upon the GCC initiative and requesting the Secretary-General to

⁽³⁰⁾ FAREA.AL-MUSLIMI, Why Yemen's Political Transition Failed, Carnegie Middle East Center, published on 16 April 2015, accessed: (July 23, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/cm40Y4M>

⁽³¹⁾ Al-Houthi Constitutional Declaration: Dissolution of Parliament, Formation of a Presidential Council and a Transitional Period for Two Years, RT Arabic, published on February 06, 2015, accessed: (July 23, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/Dm4NWAT>

⁽³²⁾ Yemen Crisis: Air raid on president's palace in Aden, BBC, published on 19 March 2015, accessed: (July 23, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/tm411iS>

⁽³³⁾ Ghassan Shabaneh, Operation Decisive Storm: Objectives and Hurdles, Aljazeera Center for studies, Published on 12 April 2015, accessed: (July 23, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/Tm41jM3>

continue his good efforts”. After the issuance of this resolution, the GCC initiative was signed. In the mid of 2012, resolution No. 2051 was issued “reaffirming the need for the full and timely implementation of the Transitional Agreement and signaling potential sanctions.” It also urges to hold the National Dialogue Conference, transitional justice and some other issues related to the transitional phase. At the beginning of 2014, resolution No. 2140 was “supporting the implementation of the National Dialogue;s outcomes, reaffirming the need for the full and timely implementation of the political transition, and establishing a system of sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.” At the beginning of 2015 the Houthis placed president Hadi under house arrest. On February 15, 2015, resolution No. 2201 was issued, denouncing the unilateral actions taken by the Houthis to dissolve the parliament and took over Yemen’s government institutions. The resolution expressed grave concern over reports of the recruitment of child soldiers, and urged all parties to continue the transitional process.” At the same time, the International Security Council issued resolution No. 2204, which extended the mandate of the Sanctions Panel of Experts to March 2016. On April 14, 2015, the Security Council issued resolution No. 2216, demanding that all Yemeni parties to fully implement resolution No. 2201 (2015), imposing an arms embargo on selected individuals and requesting that the Secretary-General intensify his good efforts in order to enable the reconstitution of the political process.”⁽³⁴⁾

In addition to this, resolution no: 2216 stipulated that the Houthis should get out of Sana’a and hand over the state’s weapons. The GCC played a major role in issuing this resolution. In fact, the implementation of this resolution will contribute

⁽³⁴⁾SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, accessed on (July21, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/lm2f9Qc>

to the protection of international peace and security, and to the building of a Yemeni political process in a more realistic way.

From the above mentioned, it is clear that Jamal Benomar has received regional and international support that no other envoy had. The UN Secretary-General visited Sana'a on November 19, 2012, to go over the process of the political settlement in the country ⁽³⁵⁾, and on January 27, 2013, members of the Security Council met the Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi in Sana'a and discussed with him the political steps to implement the GCC initiative and its mechanism.⁽³⁶⁾ It was possible to achieve a durable peace if the international and regional powers used all the tools they had to put pressure on the armed groups, especially the Houthis, but they fell short from doing that.

Even though the period of Benomar was one of the most dynamic periods “through his supervision of the implementation of the political transition process and national dialogue, he was unable to transcend political and military divisions, find national reconciliation between the conflicting parties and lay the foundations for building a modern civil state, despite the existing international resolutions that include punitive measures against obstructing the political settlement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”⁽³⁷⁾ Some of these resolutions were not implemented. In addition, the armed Houthi movement did not abide by international resolutions, especially Resolution No. 2216. The UN Security Council's monitoring of the influx of weapons to armed groups was insufficient. Of course, the UNSC imposed control over the inspection of ships coming to

⁽³⁵⁾ The Secretary-General of the UN arrives Sana'a, People's Daily Online, published on November 19, 2012, accessed: (July 21, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/vm2k4Y6>

⁽³⁶⁾ The Yemeni President meets with the delegation of the UN Security Council, Alraya al-Qataria, published on March 27, 2013, accessed: (July 21, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/zm2j9RL>

⁽³⁷⁾ Jabr al-Dhahab, The Role of the UN in Resolving the Yemeni Crisis (2011- 2016), Master Thesis, (Faculty of Strategic Sciences, Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2017), p. 164.

Yemen, but this mechanism was not effective and was not implemented. It also failed to assist the Yemeni government to monitor the coasts of smuggled arms, rendering arms embargoes was ineffective.

The Key Military Events during Benomar's Period

- The Houthi movement took over the tribal areas in Amran, Hajjah, and Sana'a (2012-2014).
 - The Houthi movement took over the center of Amran governorate, close to the capital, Sana'a, seizing weapons of the 310th Brigade, and killing its commander, Brigadier General Hameed al-Qushaibi on July 8, 2014.
 - The Houthi rebels took over the capital, Sanaa, and overthrew the Yemeni state institutions on September 21, 2014.
 - The president and the Prime Minister were placed under house arrest in January 2015.
 - President Hadi had arrived in Aden, February 20, 2015.
 - The Houthi movement lifts the house arrest of the prime minister on March 16, 2015.
 - The Operation of Decisive Storm was launched on March 26, 2015 then rapidly escalated.
- The arrival of the Houthi movement forces to Aden in April 2015.
- Jamal Benomar's resignation, April 2015.

Challenges to the Transitional Phase

There were many challenges and obstacles during the transitional phase, including the deep political differences between the signatory parties to the GCC initiative and the economic aspects. The issue of Sa'ada and the wars waged by the government of the late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh against the Houthi movement in 2004-2010 were amongst the major obstacles of the transitional process as well. In addition to the southern issue, which has already existed since the end of the war between the Yemeni government and the separatist movement in 1994, ended with the defeat of the separatist movement. This military victory created many problems accumulated between 1994 and 2011. The Yemeni government apologized for those wars during the National Dialogue Conference in 2013 and pledged to address these issues in a fair manner.⁽³⁸⁾ In addition to other challenges there was also the Houthis' desire to use military power to achieve its military and political goals.

Reasons for the Failure of the Transitional Phase

It is obvious that the weak capacity of the UN's envoy to understand the dynamics of the conflict and "the failure to deal with the root causes or the causal mechanisms of the conflict and focusing more on marginal causes"⁽³⁹⁾ are among the most important reasons for the failure of the transitional democratic process. For example, Benomar did not realize the reality of the conflict between the

⁽³⁸⁾ The Yemeni government apologizes to the southerners and the Houthis for the wars that the former regime led against them, France 24, published on August 22, 2013, accessed: (July 21, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/5m2QP6Q>

⁽³⁹⁾ Moosa Elayah, *et al*, The Role of the United Nations and its Special Envoys in the current Yemeni War: Floundering in a Tragic reality, (Governance and Peace- building center, GPBC and CIDIN, Radboud University, 2018), p 1.

Yemeni Republican current and the Houthi movement, which aspires to establish a political system based on the theocratic theories. Also, the international and regional powers that tried to find a political settlement in Yemen were not aware of the reality of this conflict. In this regard, Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi, the former Yemeni Minister of Foreign Affairs confirms that:

“One mistake made by those non-Yemeni actors involved in trying to resolve Yemen’s crisis was their lack of understanding the roots of Yemen’s political crisis. The current crisis started long before the Arab Spring; it bears the marks of the many political upheavals in both North and South Yemen, internal political conflicts and the influences of regional powers as well as sectarian, tribal and local grievances due to poor governance and unequal distribution of wealth and power.”⁽⁴⁰⁾

- The transitional government not having the ability to unify the army and security so that the entity of the national state would be preserved.
- The interference of foreign powers in the Yemeni crisis and the imposition of the terms of a political settlement on the Yemeni parties, and giving former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh and his entourage diplomatic immunity, helped him to obstruct the transitional phase, and retain control over the security forces and the Republican Guard.
- Allowing the Houthi rebels to expand militarily in the northern tribal areas without being deterred, and the continuation of military and security tension throughout the country.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi, The Yemen Crisis: A Chronology of Failures, Published on accessed: (July 16, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/fmLEk3Z>

-The spread of unemployment, poverty, and the deterioration of economic conditions during the transitional phase, allowing armed violent movements, including the Houthi movement, to exploit the deteriorating economic conditions to mobilize citizens against the government.

- The international community didn't take any practical steps against the Iranian regime, which was supporting the Houthi movement with arms during the transitional phase. The Iranian Jihan ship was intercepted by Yemeni army, loaded with around 48 tons of weapons. It was on its way to the Houthi rebels. ⁽⁴¹⁾

- Weakness of the Yemeni political leadership during the transitional phase.

- The Yemeni political leadership used the mediation method between the Houthi movement and the tribes in the northern regions, and this policy harmed the government and encouraged the Houthi movement to move forward in controlling the tribal areas until arriving to Sana'a.

-The relations between the leftist and nationalist parties with the Houthi rebels against the Islah Party as well as the influential tribal forces.

- President Hadi's reliance on the Security Council and not taking care of the traditional tribal forces, which could have stopped the military expansion of the Houthi movement towards the capital, Sana'a during the transitional phase.

Thus, during Benomar's period, it was possible to accomplish a comprehensive political settlement, implement the GCC initiative, and move to legislative, presidential and, local elections, if the UN envoy took advantage of the opportunity, but he could not despite his linguistic abilities as a fluent Arabic

⁽⁴¹⁾ Seizure of 48 tons of weapons on an Iranian ship in Yemen, Al Jazeera Net, published on February 9, 2013, accessed: (July 24, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/4m5GiWm>

speaker and can communicate with all parties. It seems that Benomar contributed to the failure of the transitional phase." Benomar was the first person to advise President Hadi to allow Houthis participation at the National Dialogue Conference. He also participated in many negotiations with the political parties and convinced them of the necessity of the Houthis presence at the NDC." ⁽⁴²⁾

Of course, we can't say that the Yemeni political parties are mostly responsible for the failure of the transitional process. Rather, regional and international influences have contributed to impeding the democratic transition process, and the UN's envoy did not perform his role as it should and was unable to help the Yemenis to get out of the crisis that afflicted the country after the signing of the GCC initiative in 2011 up until the launch of the Operation Decisive Storm in 2015. In addition, the Houthis military takeover of Sana'a on September 21, 2014, put the nails on the coffin of the transitional period.

⁽⁴²⁾ Ahmed Al-Sabahi, Jamal Benomar, Engineer of The fall of Sana'a, (IBid)

Part II

Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed:

From Kuwait Dialogue to Kerry Initiative

(2015-2018)

After the lunch of the Operation Decisive Storm on March 26, 2015, the - UN envoy for Yemen, Jamal Benomar, tenders his resignation to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.⁽⁴³⁾ on April 25, 2015, the UN Secretary-General appointed the Mauritanian diplomat Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed⁽⁴⁴⁾ as a Special Envoy for Yemen, hoping that he would make tangible progress in the political process. In his statement, the Secretary-General emphasized that "Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed will work closely with members of the United Nations Security Council and the Gulf Cooperation Council, the governments of the region, other partners as well as the United Nations team in Yemen." ⁽⁴⁵⁾

Initiatives and Dialogues during Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed's Term (2015-2018)

Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed's period did not differ from that of Jamal Benomar. His tenure focused on the political dialogues and shuttle visits to regional capitals, and no tangible progress was made in the political process. Before he officially took up his position as a special envoy for Yemen, the Sultanate of Oman put forth an initiative to resolve the Yemeni crisis. It focused on "the withdrawal of the Houthis and forces loyal to former president Ali

⁽⁴³⁾ The Yemeni Crisis..Jamal Benomartenders his resignation, Al hurra, published on April 16, 2015, accessed:(July 23, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/Vm7PO4X>

⁽⁴⁴⁾ "Ould Cheikh Ahmed brings with him more than 27 years of experience with the United Nations in development and humanitarian assistance in Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Most recently, he served as the United Nations Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and United Nations Development Programme Resident Representative in Syria (2008- 2012) and Yemen (2012-2014). He also served in several positions with the United Nations Children's Education Fund (UNICEF) including as Director of Change Management in New York, Deputy Regional Director for Eastern and Southern Africa in Nairobi and Representative in Georgia." <https://cutt.ly/Fm7SPs6>

⁽⁴⁵⁾ The Secretary-General of the United Nations appoints a new special envoy to Yemen, Ain News, published on 26 April 2015, accessed: (23 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/4m7AWx2>

Abdullah Saleh from all Yemeni cities, the handing-over of military equipment seized from the army, the return of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the government of Khaled Bahah as well as holding an early parliamentary and presidential elections.”⁽⁴⁶⁾

It is true that Ismaïl Ould Cheikh Ahmed presented more than one initiative. For example, his first initiative concentrated on the political and then military and security aspects, but the internationally recognized Yemeni government was reticent about it ⁽⁴⁷⁾ because it has already engaged in similar kinds of initiatives and agreements during the tenure of Jamal Benomar as a UN mediator when the Peace and Partnership Agreement was signed. And the political aspects of the agreement were implemented before the military and security aspects. Ismaïl Ould Cheikh Ahmed modified his initiative to implement the security, and later, the political aspects, but to no avail.

In another attempt, Ismaïl Ould Cheikh Ahmed presented a roadmap. It stipulates “the appointment of a new vice president and the formation of a national unity government that would oversee a transitional phase leading to elections and stipulate the Houthi withdrawal from Sana’a and other cities as well as handing over heavy weapons to a third party.” ⁽⁴⁸⁾ He failed to find a comprehensive political settlement; however, he tried to present a new initiative concerning the port of Hudaydah that the UN will manage the port. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ But he did not succeed, because dividing the solution means diluting the case. During this stage, John

⁽⁴⁶⁾ Nasser Abu Aoun, *The Omani Initiative to Resolve the Yemeni Crisis.. Objectives, Axes and Principles*, Atheer, Published on April 20, 2015, accessed: (July 24, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/am5XNml>

⁽⁴⁷⁾ The Yemeni government has reticent about the initiative of Ould Cheikh Ahmed, RT, published on October 26, 2016, accessed: (July 24, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/pm5JpQA>

⁽⁴⁸⁾ The UN envoy will return to Yemen in an effort to implement a Peace Agreement, France 24, published on October 31, 2016, accessed: (July 24, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/Xm5KqHk>

⁽⁴⁹⁾ Ould Cheikh Ahmed: The Hodeidah Initiative is the Beginning of a Comprehensive Solution, Al-Mawqat Post, published on August 06, 2017, accessed: (July 24, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/Km5LyGK>

Kerry, Former US Secretary of State announced his initiative. “The first phase includes a swift formation of a new national unity government, the withdrawal of forces from Sana’a and other areas and the transfer of all heavy weapons, including ballistic missiles, from the Houthis and forces aligned to them to a third party.”⁽⁵⁰⁾

The most famous political dialogues and negotiations that took place during Ould Cheikh Ahmed’s period were as follows: the Geneva 1 negotiations (June 2015), the second held on December 15, 2015, in Biel, Switzerland. The third, the Kuwait Dialogue, which was held on April 21, 2016, under the auspices of the state of Kuwait and the UN envoy for Yemen. “The agenda of the Kuwait negotiations focused on five axes: a ceasefire, a withdrawal from the cities, the handing over of weapons, the restoration of State institutions, and the file of the detainees and forcibly disappeared persons.”⁽⁵¹⁾

The conflicting parties have presented their visions for a solution, but the parties did not reach a clear agreement, the matter which leads to Kuwait negotiations failure. On February 27, 2018, the UN’s envoy, Ould Cheikh Ahmed, announced that “the Houthis failed a consensual political solution in the negotiations hosted by Kuwait in 2016, doubting that they have an actual will to end the war.”⁽⁵²⁾

Furthermore, intensive consultations were held between the Yemeni government and the Houthi movement under the auspices of Saudi Arabia in mid-2016, and the two parties reached several common points in the Saudi region of

⁽⁵⁰⁾ Lesley Wroughton, Kerry calls for unity government in Yemen to end war, Reuters, published on 25 August, 2016, accessed: (24 July, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/fm5L0eA>

⁽⁵¹⁾ Lulwa Alkhataf, Why Kuwait mediation efforts have not succeeded in resolving the Yemeni crisis, (Kuwait University, 2019), p 5.

⁽⁵²⁾ Ould Cheikh: The Houthis have failed the Political Solution. Al-Ahram, published on February 28, 2018, accessed: (July 11, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/PxvKb0D>

Dhahran Al Janub, but finally failed to sign the agreement. Through the policy of rejection pursued by some Yemeni parties, especially armed groups, it is obvious that "the issue at the local level is very complicated after six years of war. There is a local ideological division that is difficult to overcome, and it goes beyond the issue of partnership in governance, according to the international conception of conflict resolution."⁽⁵³⁾ Moreover, the association of some local forces, especially armed groups, with some regional powers complicates reaching a political settlement.

Holding such consultations without understanding the internal complications, the roots of the conflict, and seeking to find appropriate solutions through the use of real pressure tools, led to their failure. These consultations also showed that the UN envoys were not aware of the ideological dimension of the conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthi movement, as the Houthi movement seeks to establish a political system that reduces power to the family of Ahl al-Bayt, as mentioned above. Any political settlement that does not seek to pressure the Houthis to abandon these ideas means the political process will fail. It is obvious that the UN envoys focus on humanitarian issues and some political issues without trying to address the reality on the ground. Therefore, these mediations failed before binding agreements were reached. The UN envoys continued to brief the UN Security Council regarding Yemen under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, without making any progress in mediation.

⁽⁵³⁾Anwar Al-Ansi, The War in Yemen: The local Complexities and Self-financing Sources of the Conflict, BBC, published on March 25, 2021, accessed: (July 12, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/5nZTuoi>

The Security Council Resolutions issued during Ould Cheikh Ahmed's Term (2015-2018)

There were some UN Security Council resolutions issued during Ould Cheikh Ahmed's term. Resolution No. 2266 issued on 24 February 2016, which extended asset freeze and travel ban imposed by resolution No. 2140 (2015) to help stem the crisis in Yemen, which is threatening the country's ongoing political transition. The second resolution No. 2342, issued on 23 February 2017, renewed until 26 February 2018, placed an embargo on arms, a travel ban and froze assets of individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on Yemen. The third resolution No. 2402, issued on 26 February 2018, unanimously renewed the travel ban, assets freeze and arms embargo on those who are threatening the peace and security in Yemen.”⁽⁵⁴⁾

These resolutions did not bring anything new, with the exception of the arms embargo and travel ban on entities and individuals obstructed a political settlement. Therefore, Ould Cheikh Ahmed's period consisted of political initiatives and dialogues that ended in failure. Thus, there is no clear mechanism for dealing with the parties that obstruct the peace process. These resolutions had no effect in practice. The parties hindering a settlement were not persuaded by the necessity of implementing international resolutions, and this led to the indecisiveness regarding the crisis. In addition, the weak political discourse of the UN's envoy, and his inability to mobilize international public opinion, led to the failure to activate these resolutions.

The Difficulties Faced by Ould Cheikh Ahmed

⁽⁵⁴⁾ SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, accessed on (28 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/lm2f9Qc>

The UN envoy for Yemen, Ould Cheikh Ahmed, faced many challenges and difficulties during his period. These challenges included UN's inability to find a mechanism to implement Security Council Resolution No. 2216, and the stubbornness of the Houthi movement and the Yemeni government when it comes to their own visions of the shape of political solution. These factors led to the failure of the UN envoy's peace effort. In addition, UAE's support to armed groups affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist movement and Iran's continued arms shipments to the Houthis complicated the political landscape and military scene. Ould Cheikh's inability to put pressure on the Yemeni and regional parties was one of these challenges. But this was foreseen, especially since his background focused on the humanitarian aspect more than the political aspect. For this reason, his political capabilities limited him from undertaking such duties. However, he has ended his period by revealing the truth through his last briefing to the UN Security Council. He emphasized that "at the end of the consultations, it became clear that the Houthis were not prepared to make concessions on the proposed security arrangements. This has been a major stumbling block towards reaching a negotiated solution."⁽⁵⁵⁾

⁽⁵⁵⁾ THE UN SPECIAL ENVOY FOR YEMEN BRIEFS THE SECURITY COUNCIL, published on 27 Feb. 2018, accessed: (10 August 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/KQUEmEX>

Part III

Martin Griffiths:

From Stockholm Agreement to the Joint Declaration

(2018-2021)

The period of Martin Griffiths did not differ from his predecessors', although there was great hope that he would provide solutions to the Yemeni dilemma. "When Martin Griffiths was appointed in February 2018 as the Special Envoy of the UNSG to Yemen, an atmosphere of optimism prevailed in the Yemeni political circles. The perception at the time was that the appointment of a British national with good experience in peace affairs as an envoy for Yemen reflects a tendency by the international community to put an end to the tragic war in Yemen."⁽⁵⁶⁾

Based on his experience in the field of political dialogue between governments and rebels, it was expected that Griffiths will succeed in his mission. Griffiths was also the director of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. In addition to that, he is a Briton, and Britain is a superpower responsible for the Yemeni file in the United Nations (the penholder), and consequently, it was assumed that it would help Martin Griffiths succeed. Some observers viewed things through historical lens. For example, Mohammed Al-Saqqaf says: "after the Yemeni revolution in 1962 against the Imamate regime, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed the American Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Mr. Ralph Bunche (January 1963) to calm the situation in Yemen, and made his efforts to bring the Egyptian and Saudi views closer. The fate of these efforts was a success." ⁽⁵⁷⁾

⁽⁵⁶⁾Yemen Looks Forward to a New UN Envoy: Causes and Repercussions for the Political Solution Track, published on 10 Jun , 2021, accessed: (18 July, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/vmX8cTr>

⁽⁵⁷⁾Mohammad Al-Saqqaf, The Mission of the New International Envoy to Yemen and Past Experiences, Asharq Al-Awsat, publishedOn February 20, 2018, accessed: (July 19, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/mmBebOv>

Perhaps it is an irony that Ralph Bunch, the UN's envoy for Yemen, was able to convince the regional parties, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which were involved in the Yemeni conflict in the 1960s, according to the writer, Mohammad Al-Saqqaf, ⁽⁵⁸⁾ while Martin Griffiths, a British citizen whose country is one of the members the UN Security Council, was unable to convince the regional powers involved in the conflict today to stop war in Yemen.

Of course, the UN envoy, Martin Griffiths, succeeded in signing the Stockholm Agreement between the Houthi movement and the Yemeni government. One of the most important reasons for his success in holding negotiations and signing this agreement was the international pressure on the coalition, especially Saudi Arabia, after the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, in Istanbul, Turkey. The parties reached an agreement on the following: "1- An agreement on the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa. 2- An executive mechanism on activating the prisoner exchange agreement. 3- A statement of understanding on Taiz."⁽⁵⁹⁾The envoy expected that this agreement would be the beginning of a comprehensive political solution, but it has not been implemented until today, and the signatories interpreted the terms of the agreement according to their point of view.

The Stockholm Agreement has shown the failure of the UN in resolving the Yemeni conflict, because the agreement was not clear and was signed hastily under regional and international pressure on the Yemeni government to accept it. Moreover, the implementation mechanism was ambiguous. Nonetheless, a UN committee was formed to implement the military and security aspects, but it has not been able to properly carry out its work since then.

⁽⁵⁸⁾ Mohammad Al-Saqqaf, *The Mission of the New International Envoy to Yemen and Past Experiences*, (IBid).

⁽⁵⁹⁾ Full text of the Stockholm Agreement, accessed: (26 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/GQwXUqp>

In addition to the Stockholm Agreement, which was signed under the supervision of the UN envoy Griffiths, there were many initiatives proposed by him to resolve the conflict in Yemen. Most notably the "Joint Declaration", which was revealed in mid-2020.

“The United Nations' settlement plan in Yemen, proposed by Griffiths to the various parties in Yemen, includes a nationwide ceasefire, ease restrictions on the movement of people and commodities to and from the country (i.e., to open Sana'a airport for international flights and lift restrictions on Hudaydah ports), and commit the parties to the conflict to the resumption of a political process to end the conflict.”⁽⁶⁰⁾

The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia welcomed this plan. However, the Yemeni government stressed on the full implementation of the initiative through a ceasefire, opening Yemen's ports, etc., while the Houthi movement rejected it. The UN envoy, Martin Griffiths, made it clear in his last briefing to the Security Council in mid-June 2021 and confirmed that the Houthi movement “is insisting on a stand-alone agreement on the Hudaydah ports and Sana'a airport, as a precondition for the ceasefire and the launch of the political process. The Government of Yemen, as we know well, on the other hand, insisted on all these issues, the ports and the airport, the ceasefire and the launch of political process, all these issues must be agreed to and implemented as a package, and in particular with the focus on getting that ceasefire started.”⁽⁶¹⁾

⁶⁰UN Special Envoy for Yemen Briefing to UNSC and the International Peace Efforts- June 2021: A Bleak Picture, Situation Assessment (WCYS- Studies and Research Division, 2021), p 2.

⁽⁶¹⁾ BRIEFING TO UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE SPECIAL ENVOY FOR YEMEN – MARTIN GRIFFITHS, published on 15 June 2021, accessed: (29 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/smG0ZGm>

Through this briefing, the UN envoy made it clear in a diplomatic way that the Houthis want to implement the humanitarian aspects and open Sana'a airport and the port of Hudaydah, without stopping military operations against Marib, while Yemen's internationally recognized government wants to see the full implementation of the plan. Obviously, the Houthis are still counting on a military solution. Thus, the UN envoy concluded his mediation, which lasted for more than three years without achieving any tangible progress on the political and military sides.

Clearly, the joint declaration initiative stumbled because it focused on the Houthi movement and the Yemeni government, and neglected other local actors. Also, the focus of the UN envoy on ending the war, without a mechanism on how to build lasting and sustainable peace, led to the failure of the implementation of the initiative. In addition to the UN seeking to conclude a deal between the Houthi movement and the Yemeni government based on the military reality on the ground, if this happened, it would encourage other local armed groups to use violence as a mean to achieve their political goals.

Martin Griffiths and the Prisoners and Forcibly Disappeared Issue

Martin Griffiths has tried to solve the issue of the prisoners and abductees so that it would be a start to resolve the Yemeni crisis politically. He coordinated consultations between the Yemeni government and the Houthi movement, but he did not succeed in this file completely. In fact, "Local negotiations held in Yemen and ran by tribal mediators have succeeded in releasing more prisoners than have international efforts. Local negotiations are not bound to a specific process and do

not have to go through bureaucratic challenges.”⁽⁶²⁾ Between 2019 and 2020, exchanged accusations continued between the Yemeni government and the Houthi movement on obstructing the prisoners' file. On September 27, 2020, the two parties, under the auspices of the Red Cross and the UN's mission, agreed to release a group of prisoners and abductees. The number of the released was 1,081 detainees, according to a statement by the Office of the UN Envoy. ⁽⁶³⁾ Several meetings were held between the Yemeni government and the Houthi movement “have taken place over a planned prisoner exchange as called for in the Stockholm Agreement. Although some exchanges of wounded personnel and prisoners have taken place, the talks have not produced a comprehensive agreement to date.”⁽⁶⁴⁾

Resolutions during the Term of UN Envoy Martin Griffiths (2018-2021)

The UN Security Council issued many resolutions during the period of Martin Griffiths. For instance, the Security Council “Unanimously adopting resolution 2451 (2018), the Council “insisted” that all parties fully respect the ceasefire agreed for Hudaydah governorate as well as the commitment to redeploy their forces away from Hudaydah city and the port areas, to agreed locations outside, “within 21 days of the ceasefire coming into force.” ⁽⁶⁵⁾ At the beginning of 2019 there was a new resolution No. “2452 authorizing the establishment of a

⁽⁶²⁾ Salah Salah, UN-Backed Prisoner Swap Negotiations in Yemen Locked in Stalemate, Sana'a Center, published on 07 June 2021, accessed:

(26 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/kQwLZ3H>

⁽⁶³⁾ A joint press statement by the Office UN's Envoy for Yemen and the International Committee of the Red Cross on the fourth meeting of the Supervisory Committee on the Implementation of the Prisoner and Detainee Exchange Agreement, accessed: (July 25, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/bQwD2oa>

⁽⁶⁴⁾ Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, (Congressional Research Service, 2019), p 4.

⁽⁶⁵⁾ Warring parties in Yemen must ‘fully respect’ Hudaydah ceasefire – UN Security Council, UN News, Published on 21 December 2018, accessed at: (20 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/1m1WYDK>

new Special Political Mission, the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement.”⁽⁶⁶⁾

In addition to the resolution No. 2481, 2019, which extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) until January 15, 2020; and the resolution No. 2505, 2020, which extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) until July 15, 2020; and resolution No. 2511, February 25, 2020, which renewed the sanctions against Yemen imposed by the Security Council resolution No. 2140 (2014) until February 26, 2021; and the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts until March 28, 2021, resolution No. 2564, 2021, strongly condemned the ongoing escalation in Marib, renewed the ban on destabilizing actors in Yemen, and extended the mandate of Sanctions Committee Expert Panel to March 28, 2022, as well as resolution No. 2586, July 2021, the mandate of the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), which was extended until July 15, 2022.⁽⁶⁷⁾

These resolutions were issued by the Security Council to support the efforts of Martin Griffiths in order to implement the Hudaydah agreement with the hope that this would be the first step of finding a solution to the Yemeni crisis. However, all these efforts were unsuccessful due to several factors including: First, the Houthi movement’s lack of real desire to implement the agreement, and General Michael Lollesgaard, head of the UN’s Redeployment Committee, accusing the Houthi rebels of “putting obstacles to the redeployment plan at Hudaydah and its

⁽⁶⁶⁾ UNMHA, Hudaydah Agreement, published on 16 January 2019, accessed: (20 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/5m1E9HL>

⁽⁶⁷⁾ SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, accessed on (29 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/lm2f9Qc>

ports.”⁽⁶⁸⁾ Second, the lack of pressure tools on the Houthi movement to implement the agreement. Third, the western coast of Yemen is not controlled by the Yemeni government forces but joint forces, and these forces are affiliated with Arab Coalition, specifically UAE.

The UN Security Council has passed many resolutions since the beginning of the crisis based on the reports of the envoys of the Secretaries-General of the UN to Yemen. It is noted that these resolutions were not in the interest of the Yemeni cause. Of course, on some individuals and entities, but the Security Council did not establish a mechanism to control weapons smuggled to the Houthis on a regular basis, and the UN fell short from protecting civilians in Hudaydah despite the presence of a UN mission to monitor the ceasefire in the area. In addition, the Houthi movement targeted Marib with ballistic missiles and continue to imposing a siege on the densely populated city of Taiz, without the intervention of the UN Security Council. It is noted that all resolutions refer to a need to find a political solution to the Yemeni crisis, but there is no executive mechanism to be applied on the ground which made these resolutions useless.

Difficulties faced by Martin Griffith

There were many difficulties that Martin Griffith faced during his period. The most important are:

- A lack of commitment of the Houthi movement to implement the Stockholm Agreement.

⁽⁶⁸⁾ General Lollesgaard admits the Houthis obstructed the Hudaydahagreement, published on March 02, 2019, accessed: (July 24, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/rm59UHD>

- Difficulties related to the humanitarian files of the forcibly disappeared, the political prisoners, and the siege of Taiz.
- The multiplicity of local actors to the conflict within the territory of the Republic of Yemen, as well as the multiplicity of regional actors involved in the Yemeni conflict. These actors moved freely without real pressure from the permanent members of the Security Council.

Weaknesses of Martin Griffiths' Efforts

- Martin Griffiths used the policy of soft diplomacy by repeatedly describing the Houthi movement as a party in the conflict. He overlooked its violations regarding the Stockholm Agreement while working as a UN envoy. This kind of diplomacy does not work with armed groups, and it has proven its failure.
- He tried to pursue a policy of neutrality, which, of course, a negative neutrality because he did not reveal the ways this party was obstructing the peace process.
- Martin Griffiths did not have a clear strategy to deal with the crisis and put pressure on the Yemeni government and the Houthi movement to accept the peace process. The Stockholm Agreement and the draft of the Joint Declaration adopted by him revealed that his strategy was based on addressing humanitarian issues not political and military issues.
- His attempt to focus on the legal aspects and the issues of prisoners and abductees.
- His focus on appointing women advisors and some personalities who claim neutrality but lack the in-depth knowledge of the tribal culture and the situation in the northern areas under the control of the Houthi movement. This method led to his inability to understand the dynamics of the conflict in the country.

Thus, Martin Griffith could not convince the Houthi movement that violence must stop. His vision and mechanism were inadequate to address economic issues, since armed groups benefited from the continuation of the war and the black market. If economic sanctions were used against warlords, the situation would be different. He could not even convince the Arab coalition of the need to abandon its economic ambitions in Yemen, as well as not being able to convince the United Arab Emirates of the need to cease its military support for the separatist groups.

A Study of the UN Envoys' Role in Yemen (2011-2021)

As mentioned above, the efforts of successive UN envoys was not in accordance with the references recognized by the international community, including the GCC initiative, the outcomes of the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference (NDC), and international resolutions related to the conflict, especially UN Resolution No. 2216. Rather, each envoy presented his vision for a solution, far from the mission that he came to fulfill, which is the implementation of international resolutions, that is why those attempts were doomed to fail.

Also, the approaches of the UN envoys were not commensurate with the current situation, as most of them focused on less important issues that are not related to the conflict. They did not involve traditional tribal forces. Actually, these tribal forces have an influential role in peacemaking, if their abilities are properly exploited. The envoys also linked the conflict in Yemen to the humanitarian crisis, although the cause of the humanitarian crisis is the armed rebellion and the coup against Yemen's constitutional institutions by the Iranian-backed Houthi movement. Therefore, such approaches cannot work because they do not focus on the roots of Yemen's problems.

When the UN envoys did not produce anything new regarding the Yemeni dilemma, the United States President Joe Biden asked his Middle East team to ensure his support for the United Nations' initiative to impose a ceasefire, open humanitarian channels and restore long-dormant peace talks.⁽⁶⁹⁾ He sent Timothy A. Lenderking as a Special Envoy for Yemen. Timothy A. Lenderking has been conducting dialogues with regional, international, as well as local powers since the beginning of 2021. It seems that the presence of the US envoy alongside the current UN envoy, Hans Grundberg, will have a significant impact on the course of events in Yemen, if the US leverages its diplomatic sway through cooperation with the European Union, in particular. Mr. Hans is a European and, of course, will be supported by the European Union to achieve a political settlement. His success means the success of the European Union. Therefore, the success of the next phase depends on the extent of cooperation between the UN envoy and the US envoy in finding new means and tools to deal with the Yemeni dilemma, and by activating the international legitimacy resolutions related to the Yemeni crisis.

During the past decade, the UN envoys for Yemen were unable to make any progress in the political process between the Houthi movement and the Yemeni government due to many internal and regional obstacles as well as the Houthi movement adheres to its theory of power, which is based on a theocratic theory, which made the envoys unable to convince it of a political partnership. Moreover, the UN envoys did not deal with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is backed by the UAE, and controls the city of Aden, and other areas in Lahj, Abyan, and Al-Dhalea, especially after its formation in 2017. The STC seeks to

⁽⁶⁹⁾ Amanda Macias, 'This war has to end' — Biden halts U.S. support for offensive military operations in Yemen, CNBC, Published on 04 February 2021, accessed: (31 July 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/YQd1wrI>

separate the southern regions from the northern regions and demands an independent state.

It is obvious, that each of the previous UN envoys recognized the truth at the end of his period, as Jamal Benomar ended his term by describing the situation in Yemen with his famous phrase: “Yemen is in the wind.”⁽⁷⁰⁾ Ismaïl Ould Cheikh Ahmed revealed at the end of his term that the Houthis are not ready to compromise and there can be no solution if the Houthis want to keep their weapons or have a military force outside the framework of the state.⁽⁷¹⁾ The third envoy, Martin Griffiths, concluded his mediation period which lasted for more than three years, by describing the scene in pessimistic terms describing the current situation as a "bleak picture."⁽⁷²⁾

⁽⁷⁰⁾ Mohammad Al-Ajmi. “The position of the GCC on the Current Developments in Yemen,”(Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Doha, 2015), p. 5.

⁽⁷¹⁾ Ould Cheikh Ahmed reveals the secrets of Kuwait's closed consultations on Yemen. Russia Today, published on 03-02-2018 , accessed: (July 29, 2021), <https://cutt.ly/fhj6csK>

⁽⁷²⁾ UN Special Envoy for Yemen Briefing to UNSC and the International Peace, (IBid).

Difficulties Facing the New UN Envoy Hans Grundberg

The United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, has recently appointed Hans Grundberg of Sweden as his Special Envoy for Yemen.⁽⁷³⁾ The Yemeni government, and political parties such as the Islah Party, as well as the armed groups (the Southern Transitional Council, Tariq Saleh's forces, and the Iran-backed Houthi movement), welcomed the appointment of the Swedish diplomat Hans Grundberg as the new UN envoy for Yemen. Each of the local parties has its own point of view regarding the solution to the Yemeni dilemma. The STC demanded Hans Grundberg to amend Resolution No. 2216. The Houthi movement requested him to work for cessation of “the coalition’s military operations,” while the Islah party advised him to start from where his predecessors had left.⁽⁷⁴⁾

It is clear that the task of the new international envoy, Hans Grundberg, will be difficult and complex. There are many issues that are needed to be addressed, including the mediation between the Yemeni government and the Houthi movement, the southern issue, the other small armed groups, the dilemma of the regional powers involved directly in the Yemeni conflict, the prisoners and abductees, the weapons smuggled to the Houthi movement from Tehran as well as the humanitarian issue.

⁽⁷³⁾ Mr. Hans Grundberg of Sweden - Special Envoy for Yemen, UN, published on 06 August 2021, accessed on: (07 August, 2021), at:

⁽⁷⁴⁾ Local Parties welcome and advice the New Envoy, Al-Masdar Online, published on August 08, 2021, accessed: (August 09, 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/7QTn5r0>

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 24.1 million people (approximately 80 percent) in Yemen are in need of some form of assistance or protection, and that 16.2 million people (approximately 54 percent) suffer from acute food insecurity at varying levels, some of them having reached the point of starvation, in addition to the presence of 3.65 million displaced persons, most of whom face difficult conditions.⁽⁷⁵⁾

These staggering numbers require a fundamental change in the mediation mechanisms followed by the United Nations during previous periods and a pursuit to apply the local and the Security Council resolutions in Yemen.

The international community, including the United States and the European Union, support a stable federal Yemen and refuse to divide the country. Therefore, the UN can benefit from this political support in achieving a comprehensive settlement in a manner that maintains the entity of the Yemeni federal state. If the new envoy continues to follow the same previous approaches by implementing political agreements without applying the security and military aspects, and fragmenting the solution, as Griffiths did through the Stockholm Agreement on Hudaydah, he might end up managing crises and conflicts, but he will not find a tangible solution to the conflict. Therefore, the changing approaches will help the UN envoy in achieving a comprehensive peace.

Recently, Mr. Hans Grundberg published his article, 'Ravaged by war and destruction – how Europe broke its vicious cycle and believes Yemen can do the

⁽⁷⁵⁾Conference to Support Humanitarian Response in Yemen: Towards More Efficient International Response,(The Emirates Policy Center "EPC" 2021), accessed: (09 August 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/0QYNHxZ>

same.’ In his article, he emphasized that peace in Yemen is possible if there is a political will and brave leadership. The essential spirit of compromise, cooperation and trust between political adversaries is today urgently needed in Yemen. ⁽⁷⁶⁾ In this context, one of the most important difficulties that the new envoy will face is the Houthi movement and its regional supporter Iran will not accept a political settlement led by the United States and Saudi Arabia unless it serves the interest of the Houthi movement. Likewise, the Southern Transitional Council and its regional supporter (the UAE) will not accept any political settlement, if it does not achieve STC’s ambitions, which is a separation of the Southern areas and creating a new state. Therefore, without a strict mechanism to deal with these parties in accordance with the internationally recognized references, including the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen, the GCC Initiative, the outcomes of Yemeni National Dialogue Conference outcomes, UN Resolution No. 2216, this means the continuation of the war.

However, if the European Union and the United States exercise a policy of pressure on the regional powers interfering in the Yemeni conflict and succeed in convincing them of the need to contribute to achieve peace in Yemen, it will become easier for Hans Grundberg to achieve reconciliation between the main local actors and to form a government of national unity according to the internationally recognized references. In order to achieve a comprehensive peace in general, the economic issues and the military situation on the ground must be properly addressed.

⁽⁷⁶⁾ Hans Grundberg, Ravaged by war and destruction – how Europe broke its vicious cycle and believes Yemen can do the same, published on 09/05/2021, accessed: (20 August 2021), at: <https://cutt.ly/UQNf1hI>

Conclusion

Obviously, the post-2015 Yemeni crisis became complicated because of the presence of some regional powers involved in the ongoing conflict, and seeking to preserve their interests by all means. The multiplicity of local parties, with support from regional parties, complicates the process of a political solution under the supervision of the UN. Therefore, whenever the UN tries to find a comprehensive settlement to resolve the Yemeni crisis, other crises emerge. In addition to this, the UN, as a mediator, is trying to remain at the same distance from all parties, and has not taken any explicit position against those who obstruct the implementation of international resolutions and political agreements and impede the process of political transition and democratic transition, which made UN envoys' neutrality turn into a negative neutrality.

Further, the UN does not have a clear mechanism to deal with the Yemeni crisis in a stricter manner, considering that the UN represents the global system, and is practically supported by the UN Security Council, with its mission to protect international peace and security. Many international resolutions were issued on the Yemeni crisis, and some of them were under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, yet no proper action was taken to implement these resolutions in a manner that preserves Yemen's safety, security, stability and territorial integrity.

A decade has passed since the Yemeni crisis began, different UN envoys for Yemen were unable to provide tangible results on the ground except for conducting some unfruitful dialogues, releasing some of the forcibly disappeared from the detentions of the Houthi rebels and some prisoners of war from the prisons of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, as well as supervising the signing of the Stockholm Agreement between the Yemeni

government and the Houthi rebels, but that agreement has not been implemented on the ground. This indicates that the UN does not have the power to implement this agreement, but rather is just a mediator.

This is the conclusion of the study in general, but it is necessary to clarify some other details. It is necessary to change the mechanisms of the UN in mediation, activate the resolutions of the UN Security Council, focus on the roots of the Yemeni crisis, and seek to address it, and starting to mediate in a realistic way by bringing the views of the regional powers closer, and putting pressure on them to stop their escalation in Yemen, and then conduct a dialogue between the influential parties on the ground as a first phase, then other small local parties, discussing armament issues, the withdraw of armed groups from urban areas, and reducing weapons are in the hands of the state as well discussing the humanitarian issues. This will not happen without significant regional and international support, through mobilizing world public opinion, including the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League towards achieving peace.

Repeating the mechanism of previous mediation of the UN that has been used over the past decade, will not lead to sustainable peace, but rather to the opportunities for armed groups to seize strategic areas, and then the collapse of what remains of the weak Yemeni state institutions. This means Yemen will enter into identity and sectarian conflicts, and this will lead to the disintegration of the country, which will have negative effects on security in Yemen, regional and internal security. Moreover, international interests will be harmed.

Recommendations

The following suggestions are for the New UN envoy for Yemen.

- Positive neutrality is important for effective mediation along with the regional and international expertise and support required to implement a lasting and comprehensive peace. This is fulfilled by calling things by their names. For example, the UN must distinguish between the Houthi movement that seized the institutions of the Yemeni state by force, and the legitimate Yemeni political system recognized by the international community according to international references and laws. However, the discourse of the UN soon turned to equate the Houthi movement with the Yemeni state and referring to both as “all parties to the conflict”. This shift in the political discourse of the successive UN envoys led to their subsequent inability to find a real settlement.
- Understand the root of the conflict in Yemen, and seek to address it in a more realistic way. This will not be done without seeking an implementation of international resolutions, and focusing on the active forces on the ground, including the forces that have not formally engaged in the conflict like the traditional tribal forces...etc.
- Listen to and benefiting from the political initiatives presented by political parties, research centers, civil and tribal forces.
- Activate international resolutions regarding the arms embargo.
- Discuss the military and security issues in a realistic manner, and disarming armed groups removing heavy weapons as a first stage, and then entering into a comprehensive political process and a transitional phase.
- Deal on the humanitarian aspects in isolation from the economic and military aspects.

- Seek to integrate all forces of the conflict and to involve women, youth, tribes and the rest of society in any future political processes.

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